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COMMENTS ON RECENT CASES
defendant, although doing business in Colorado, was not domiciled
in that state.40 After considering other factors, the court decided that
Colorado had no significant interest which conflicted with Penn-
sylvania's and, therefore, the apparent conflict would be resolved in
favor of the state having sole interest in the outcome of the litigation.
However, it could be argued that Colorado had a legitimate, albeit
minimal, interest in limiting recovery against the defendant airline
due to the benefits which its continued operation bestowed upon that
state.41 On this basis, it is possible that the court should have pro-
vided a solution which, rather than discarding Colorado's interest,
decided the case as one involving a true conflict.42 Had this been
done, a precedent could have been rationally articulated for future
Pennsylvania cases which may involve similar fact situations but in
which the defendant's closer connection with a foreign jurisdiction
enhances that jurisdiction's interest in the outcome of the litigation.4 3
For example, the foreign state may be the principal place of business
or the domicile of the defendant. Therefore, by disregarding Colo-
rado's interest, however small, the court failed to provide a useful
precedent for future cases involving foreign interests which may be
greater than were those of Colorado in the instant case.
Nevertheless, the instant case is a welcome addition to the body of
law dealing with the solution of conflict problems. It is representa-
tive of an approach which, although not as simple in application as
the old rule and in need of further development by the courts, 44
promises to yield more rational and just determinations of suits involv-
ing conflicting laws.
Constitutional Law-Legislative Freedom of Speech-Constitutional
Privilege Available to Congressman Charged With Bribery.-The
defendant, a congressman, was indicted with another congressman
40 Ibid.
41 Cf. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Equal Protection, 28 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 47 (1960); Weintraub, A Method for Solving
Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 Comm L.Q. 215, 245 (1963); 74 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1652,
1654 (1961).
42For a proposed solution to the resolution of a true conflict, i.e., where two or
more states have legitimate interests in the outcome of the litigation, see Wein-
traub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 Com'izL L.Q. 215 (1963).
43 It is interesting to note that, at the time the instant case was argued before
the court, there were cases pending in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania which appear to be quite similar to the instant
case. See 203 A.2d at 798 n.2. In these cases it is possible that the airline there
involved had a greater connection with the foreign state, thereby increasing that
state's interest. It is questionable whether the instant case will provide the
federal court with a sufficient basis for decisions in these cases, since no significant
extraterritorial interest was recognized by the court in the instant case.
44The court's language under these circumstances seems particularly apt:
'We are at the beginning of the development of a workable, fair and flexible ap-
proach to choice of law which will become more certain as it is tested and further
refined when applied to specific cases before our courts." 203 A.2d at 806.
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and two other men for conspiracy to defraud the United States and
for violation of conflict-of-interest statutes. The substantive acts con-
stituting the conspiracy were payments received by the congressmen
from their co-defendants for making certain speeches on the floor of
the House of Representatives. The congressman moved to dismiss
the conspiracy count of the indictment on the ground that it was
barred by article I, section 6 of the United States Constitution be-
cause it called for inquiry into a speech in Congress. After this mo-
tion had been denied by the trial court," the jury returned guilty ver-
dicts against all defendants. The second congressman did not appeal.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, held, judgment against the congressman vacated and case re-
manded on conflict-of-interest counts. The constitutional privilege of
a congressman not to be questioned in any other place for a speech
made in Congress bars a criminal charge founded upon such a speech.
United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964).
Although the privilege of the legislator not to answer for his
speeches outside the chamber of which he is a member may be said to
have emerged in the sixteenth century, it is actually of far greater
antiquity.2 After a member of the House of Commons had been
prosecuted in the miners' court for offering legislation in Parliament
to regulate tin mining, an act was passed in 1512 declaring that pros-
ecutions arising out of proceedings in Parliament were void.3  An-
other aspect of the privilege appeared in 1541 when freedom of speech
for members of Parliament was included in the petition of Commons
to the King.4 The disagreement between Parliament and the monarch
as to the extent of the privilege granted was illustrated in 1593 when
Elizabeth I warned Commons that their duty was to accept or reject
the proposals set before them, not to "meddle with reforming the
Church and transforming the Commonwealth .... ,,; Nevertheless, her
lUnited States v. Johnson, 215 F. Supp. 300 (D. Md. 1963). The constitutional
privilege upon which the defendant relied provides:
The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the
United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach
of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the
Session of their respective Houses and going to and returning from the
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House they shall not be
questioned in any other Place. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
2See MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAmINT 48-49
(16th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as MAY]; WrrT, THE HisTony OF ENGLISH
PA RLImANARY PrLrEGE 23-25 (Ohio State University Studies No. 6, 1921) [here-
inafter cited as WIETK]; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Legislative
and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLu .L. REv. 131, 132 (1910) [hereinafter cied
as Veeder]; Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Mean-
ing and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 960, 962 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Yankwich].
3 Privilege of Parliament Act, 1512, 4 Hen. 8, c. 8. For further discussion of the
landmark case which prompted this act, see MAY 49-50; TASWELL-LANGLEAD, ENG-
LISH CONSTT OxAL HISToRY 247-49 (n1th ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as TAswEua-
LANGLIEAD].
4 See MAY 45, 50; Veeder 132; Yankwich 963. Also see TAswE.-LANGmEAD 246-47.
rPROTHEO, SzECT STATUTEs Am OT=E CoNSrnmoNAL DocumENTs 124-25 (4th
ed. 1913). Also see id. at 119, 125-26.
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reign was marked by a number of instances in which she was forced
to yield to assertions of the privilege. 6 Several years later the pro-
testations of Commons delivered to James I went to the extent of in-
sisting that the privileges of Parliament arose by inheritance from
ancient times and not by the toleration of the sovereign.7 The final
chapter in the struggle between the monarch and Parliament began
with the arrest and conviction in 1629 of Sir John Elliot and two others
for their conduct in Parliament." The judgment against them in the
King's Bench was reversed in 1668 when the House of Lords con-
cluded that the conviction was illegal and that only Parliament could
deal with words spoken thereinY Thus, by the middle of the seven-
teenth century Parliament's privilege vis-a-vis the Crown was clearly
established. In 1688, Parliament adopted the Bill of Rights, which
included an article providing that "the freedome of speech and debates
or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned
in any court or place out of Parlyament."' 0 At this point, a new era
in the history of the privilege commenced, for since that time the
privilege has normally been asserted to protect the legislator from his
fellow citizen rather than from the ruler.
The privilege thus established by Parliament was claimed by the
earliest colonial assemblies in this country.' Later, the United States
Constitution guaranteed legislators freedom of speech by providing
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place."'12 Similar provisions are today found
in many state constitutions.' 3 Although generally limited by terms
6 See TASWEr=-LANGLImAD 313; WnE 26-27.
7 Paoramo, op. cit. supra note 5, at 311-12, 313-14. Also see MVAY 50-51.
8 Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, 3 State Tr. 294 (1629). The privilege was
denied on the basis that the Privilege of Parliament Act, 1512, 4 Hen. 8, c. 8, was
only a private act. Id. at 309-10. Compare note 3 supra and accompanying text.
In 1641 the conviction was declared by the House of Commons to be against the
law and privilege of Parliament. Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, 3 State Tr.
294, 310-13 (1641). The significance of this famous case has been widely discussed.
See MAY 51; TASWEmL-LANGAMAD 376-78, 390; Wrnri 29-30. See also Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951).
9 Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, 3 State Tr. 294, 391 (1668); 9 H.C. JoUa.
19, 25 (1667-1687); 12 H.L. Jous. 166, 223 (1666-1675).
101 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2, art. 9 (1688).
" See CLARKE, PARLIAILENTARY PRIVILEGE 3W THE AImuRIcA" COLONIES 61 passim
(Yale Historical Publications No. 44, 1943); Yankwvich 965.
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; see note 1 supra.
13 See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 56; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 6; ARZ. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 2, § 7; ARK. CONST. art. V, § 15; COLO. CoNsT. art. V, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. III,
§ 13; DEL. CoNsT. art. II, § 13; GA. CoNsT. art. III, § VA para. Ill; HAwAII CONST.
art. II, § 8; IDAHO CoNsT. art. III, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 14; IND. CONsT. art. 4, §
8; KA. CoNsT. art. 2, § 22; Ky. CONST. § 43; LA. CONST. art. III, § 13; iE. CoNST.
art. IV, pt. 3, § 8; MVn. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 10; ID. CONST. art. 11, §
18; MAsS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXI; MVcH. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Muq. CoNsT. art. IV,
§ 8; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 19; MONT. CONsT. art. V, § 15; NEB. CoNsT. art. m, § 26;
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 30; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § IV, para. 9; N.MV CoNsT. art. IV, §
13; N.Y. CoNsT. art II, § 11; ND. CoNsT. art II, § 42; OHio CONST. art. I, § 12;
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to "speeches" and "debates," the privilege has been extended to various
civil actions arising from committee proceedings, 4 voting,15 publica-
tion of legislative documents,' 6 and the proceedings of local legisla-
tive bodies." This extension has been pursuant to a policy of rather
OKLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 22; ORE. CowsT. art. IV, § 9; PA. CONST. art. I, § 15; RI.
CONST. art. IV, § 5; S.D. CONST. art. Il, § 11; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 13; TEx. CONST.
art. II, § 21; UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 14; VA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 48; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 17; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 17; Wis. CoNsT. art. IV, §
16; Wyo. CONST. art. II, § 16. Differences in phraseology among the constitutional
privisions are apparently without significance. See Veeder 135. Statutory pro-
visions guaranteeing legislators freedom of speech are also found in a number of
states. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 2.23 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. A.N. § 14:50(1) (1950);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120-9 (1964).
Judicial and executive officers are also protected by common-law privilege
from liability for acts in their official capacities. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564 (1959) (libel action against Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabili-
zation); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (action by attorney against
judge for removal from practice); Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955)
(action under civil rights statutes against justice of the peace); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) (action against immigration officers). These privileges
are not overcome by allegations of maliciousness so long as the official is acting
in "matters committed by law to his control or supervision." Barr v. Matteo,
supra at 572-74; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). Also see Simons v.
O'Connor, 187 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Oppenheimer v. Ashburn, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 624, 343 P.2d 931 (1st Dist. 1959); Bottomley v. Brougham, [1908] 1 K.B.
584. For an example of the ambiguous position taken on this matter by the
Supreme Court of Iowa, see Ryan v. Wilson, 231 Iowa 33, 51, 300 N.W. 707, 716
(1941).
14 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Barsky v. United States, 167
F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948); Allen v. Superior Court,
171 Cal. App. 2d 444, 340 P.2d 1030 (4th Dist. 1959); Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J.
Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
1 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201-05 (1880); Canfield v. Gresham,
82 Tex. 10, 17 S.W. 390 (1891).
10 See Methodist Fed'n for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C.
1956). See also Williams v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 185 F.2d 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1950), where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant congressman had
inserted defamatory matter as an extension of his remarks in the Appendix of the
Congressional Record. The trial court dismissed on the ground that the matter was
privileged. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed,
however, on the ground that the matter was not defamatory. On this basis the
court stated there was no need to consider the plea of privilege. Id. at 1007.
1 See Martelli v. Pollock, 162 Cal. App. 2d 655, 328 P.2d 795 (1st Dist. 1958) (city
council members immune from liability for passing illegal ordinance); McGaw v.
Hamilton, 184 Pa. 108, 39 Atl. 4 (1898) (conditional privilege to borough council
members for libelous statement); Wasserman v. City of Kenosha, 217 Wis. 223, 258
N.W. 857 (1935); cf. Stahm v. Klein, 179 Cal. App. 2d 512, 4 Cal. Rptr. 137 (4th
Dist. 1960) (court may not presume improper motives on part of city council). The
Restatement provides that proceedings before a legislative body other than Congress
or a state legislature are subject to only a qualified privilege in defamation ac-
tions. RESTATEIENT, TORTS § 590, comment c (1938); id. at § 599.
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liberal interpretation of the privilege. 8 Similarly, the privilege has
been sustained in a wide variety of types of civil actions, including
actions for defamation, 9 false imprisonment,20 unlawful arrest,21 and
assault,2 2 as well as suits under the civil rights statutes.23
In spite of this broad application there has been no authoritative
exposition of the full extent to which legislative speech is privileged.
The term "absolutely privileged," 24 which has applied to legislative
speech, has not yet been fully defined except to indicate that the
privilege is a complete bar to civil liability. The Supreme Court has
not been enlightening in the two leading cases in which the privilege
was asserted before it. The first, Kilbourn v. Thompson,25 involved
an action for false imprisonment against some congressmen and the
sergeant-at-arms of the House of Representatives arising out of the
arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff for contempt of the House.
The Court held that the action of the House was illegal because Con-
gress had exceeded its power to punish for contempt. The demurrer
18 The statement considered by the Supreme Court of the United States to be
authoritative on this point, see Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 203-04 (1880),
and the one frequently referred to in the cases, was made by Chief Justice
Parsons in Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808):
I therefore think that the article ought not to be construed strictly, but
liberally, that the full design of it may be answered. I will not confine it to
delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will
extend it to the giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to
every other act resulting from the nature, and in the execution, of the
office; and I would define the article as securing to every member exemp-
tion from prosecution, for every thing said or done by him, as a represen-
tative, in the exercise of the functions of that office, without inquiring
whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or
irregular and against their rules. I do not confine the member to his place
in the house; and I am satisfied that there are cases in which he is en-
titled to this privilege, when not within the walls of the representatives'
chamber.
However, the court held that defamatory words uttered by a legislator in the
chamber were not protected because he was not acting as a legislator. Id. at 29-31.
19 See Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874
(1930); Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J. Misc. 37, 56 A.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Dillon v. Balfour, 20 L.R. Ir. 600 (Ex. Div. 1887).
20 See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201 (1880).
21 See Canfield v. Gresham, 82 Tex. 10, 17 S.W. 390 (1891).
22 See Allen v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. App. 2d 444, 340 P.2d 1030 (4th Dist.
1959).23 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also Hancock v. Burns, 159
Cal. App. 2d 785, 323 P.2d 456 (1st Dist. 1958) (action for alleged interference
with employment contract); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n: v. Nix, 295 P.2d
286 (Okla. 1956) (proceedings to suspend attorney who was state senator).
24 See Williams v. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 185 F.2d 1005, 1006
(D.C. Cir. 1950) (quoting lower court decision); Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F.2d
783, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 874 (1930); State v. Haskins, 109 Iowa
656, 658, 80 N.W. at 1063 (1899) (dictum). Also see Barsky v. United States, 167
F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948) ("absolute immunity");
Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 113-14, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1156 (Q.B. 1839>
("complete impunity").
25103 U.S. 168 (1880).
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urged by the congressmen was sustained, however, on the ground that
the legislators came within the immunity given by the privilege since
they had done nothing more than vote for the contempt motion.28
Over seventy years later the legislator's privilege was also urged in
Tenney v. Brandhove2 7 an action under the civil rights statutes re-
sulting from an investigation conducted by a committee of the Cali-
fornia legislature. The Court there held that so long as the committee
was acting in the sphere of legitimate legislative duties in examining
the plaintiff, the courts could not inquire into that legislative ac-
tivity.28 After indicating the rather broad effect of the privilege in
each of these cases, however, the Court carefully appended caveats
to the effect that their decisions were not to be interpreted as denying
the possibility that there might be extraordinary things done in Con-
gress for which the members involved might be held legally responsi-
ble; 20 but the nature of those contingencies was not clearly defined.
Thus, the court in the instant case was faced with an issue of first
impression in determining whether the constitutional privilege against
inquiry into congressional speeches applies in criminal, as well as
civil, actions. Its decision is significant because it more clearly estab-
lishes the boundaries of the privilege by articulating the policies be-
hind it.
Two somewhat related justifications have been urged by courts ap-
plying the privilege. First, the privilege is a concomitant of separation
of powers principles.30 That is to say, inquiry by the judiciary into
the motive behind legislative proceedings would indicate a questioning
of the good faith, competence, or integrity of the latter body, which
26 Id. at 200-05.
27341 U.S. 367 (1951).
28 Id. at 378-79. The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Black emphasizes that
the validity of legislative action is not coextensive with the personal immunity of
legislators. Although the legislative action in question was valid so as to support
the claim of privilege in this action, Justice Black recognized that it would not
necessarily be valid as a basis for a prosecution of the plaintiff for failure to obey
a subpoena or a similar charge. Id. at 379-80. Compare Barsky v. United States,
167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).20Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 204-05 (1880). The Court in Kilbourn suggested that judicial inquiry
might be appropriate in the following situation:
If we could suppose the members of these bodies so far to forget their
high functions and the noble instrument under which they act as to
imitate the Long Parliament in the execution of the Chief Magistrate of
the nation, or to follow the example of the French Assembly in assuming
the function of a court for capital punishment we are not prepared to
say that such an utter perversion of their powers to a criminal purpose
would be screened from punishment by the constitutional provision for
freedom of debate. Ibid.
Compare Regina v. Bunting, 7 Ont. 524, 563 (1885) (dissent).
30 See Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Methodist Fed'n for
Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D.D.C. 1956); Hancock v. Burns,
158 Cal. App. 2d 785, 792, 323 P.2d 456, 460-61 (1st Dist. 1958); cf. Fischler v.
McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (violation of doctrine for court to
enjoin enforcement of an order of legislative investigating committee).
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is inappropriate between coordinate and coequal branches.3 1 Such
inquiry is clearly contrary to the general rule that the judiciary may
not interfere with legislative discretion when exercised in discharge
of constitutional functions.3 2  Second, the privilege is intended for
"the public good. ' 33 As such, the argument may be made that when
the speech does nothing to advance the public purposes the im-
munity no longer applies.3 4 This thesis, which was rejected in the
instant case,3 5 results from a misconstruction of the basic premise.
The public benefit which the privilege is designed to advance is not
that resulting from a particular speech, but that which is believed to
result from the deliberations of a legislature uninhibited by fear of
legal harassment.3 6 In applying the true principle, there can be no
distinction made between criminal and civil cases, for, as the court
in the instant case pointed out, fear of criminal prosecution may be
even more inhibiting to proper legislative functioning than fear of
civil sanctions.37 Therefore, the public benefit to be derived from un-
restrained legislative discussion can be achieved only by completely
insulating the legislature's deliberations from the purview of the
courts, regardless of the nature of the action. s This conclusion is
31 In a number of cases involving governmental power to perform certain func-
tions, the courts have recognized that a judicial inquiry into the motives of the
legislators is not permitted. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455
(1931) (power of United States to construct dam); Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 210 (1921) (Government's power to create banks and
issue bonds); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810) (state's power
to sell and dispose of lands). However, the purpose for which the legislation was
enacted is a proper subject for judicial inquiry. See NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp.
503, 515 n.6 (ED. Va. 1958).
32See Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643, 649 (SD.N.Y. 1954); Lanza v.
New York State Joint Legislative Comm. on Gov't Operations, 3 N.Y.2d 92, 99-100,
164 N.Y.S.2d 9, 15, 143 N.E.2d 772, 776 (1957); Incorporated Village of Hicksville v.
Blakeslee, 103 Ohio St. 508, 518-19, 134 N.E. 445, 448 (1921).
a3Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, 1 Misc. 2d 511, 515, 147 N.Y.S.2d 178, 182
(Munic. Ct. 1955), dismissed per curiam, 355 U.S. 12 (1957).
34The Government in the instant case presented this argument effectively in the
trial court. 337 F.2d at 189. Also see Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr, supra
note 33, at 515, 147 N.Y.S.2d at 182. Those arguing in favor of conditional privilege
for legislators have used the "public good" analysis. See Field, The Constitutional
Privileges of Legislators, 9 Mmn. L. REv. 442, 445-46 (1925); Yankwich 970-76.
35 337 F.2d at 189-90. Also see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
36 See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (dictum); Veeder 131; Yankwich 966;
cf. Bottomley v. Brougham, [1908] 1 K.B. 584 (absolute privilege for judicial
officers, advocates, and witnesses).
37337 F.2d at 190.
38 The basic justification for granting an absolute privilege to public officials was
pointed out by Judge Learned Hand as he considered a complaint for false arrest
against immigration officers:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty
of using his powers... for any other personal motive not connected with
the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so
cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the
guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery .... In this instance it has
1965]
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consistent with the English cases39 which have considered the privilege
in relation to a criminal charge, as well as the view expressed in the
texts40 and American cases.41
Although even criminal misconduct will not outweigh the public
interest in legislative freedom of speech, it would appear from the
caveats in Kilbourn and Tenney that the Supreme Court is extremely
hesitant about extending the immunity without limit. The court in
the instant case also recognized that the immunity might not apply
when the legislative action being questioned was "so extreme that the
Congress as a whole, because of its total involvement in the corrup-
tion, was incapable of taking appropriate disciplinary action against
individual members."42  In other words, the courts will allow the
privilege to be absolute so long as there are some other controls which
may be applied to protect other interests.43 Assuming the validity of
this "alternative control" standard,4 4 the question arises as to whether
the particular control suggested is an appropriate limit for legislative
freedom of speech. Congressional discipline for misconduct in the
chamber has been rare,45 and many of those instances have related
been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by
dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the
constant dread of retaliation. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d
Cir. 1949).
An analogy may be drawn to the protections given by the Supreme Court against
restrictions of first amendment freedoms which force the affected parties to "steer
far wider of the unlawful zone" than is consistent with those freedoms. See
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). Accord, Baggett v. Bullitt, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1316, 1323 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964), 50
IOWA L. REv. 170.
30 Proceedings Against Sir John Elliot, 3 State Tr. 294 (1629); Ex parte Wason,
L.R. 4 Q.B. 573 (1869).
40 See CusHaN, LAw Aim PRAcTICE OF LEGISLATIVE Assxr zs 243 (2d ed. 1866);
MAY 65.
41 See, e.g., State v. Haskins, 109 Iowa 656, 658, 80 N.W. at 1063 (1899) (dictum);
Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (dictum); Van Riper v. Tumulty, 26 N.J.
Misc. 37, 44-45, 56 A.2d 611, 615-16 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (dictum).
42337 F.2d at 191. (Emphasis added.) The constitutional provision which the
court considered in this connection states: "Each House may determine the Rules
of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
43Although a majority of the members participated in the improper act in
Kilbourn, that case is distinguishable from the one hypothesized because it must be
assumed that the voting for punishment for contempt was done with a bona fide
belief in its legality and with no taint of corruption. Thus, there was not an
abeyance in the congressional disciplinary power, but at best a mistake of law by
a majority of the House.
44The Supreme Court has considered the congressional disciplinary power
in evaluating the validity of the legislator's privilege. See Tenney v. Brandlhove,
341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951). Also see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949); Mills v. Denney, 245 Iowa 584, 588, 63 N.W.2d 222, 225 (1954).
45From 1789 to 1935 Congress censured only twenty of its members and ex-
pelled only eighteen. See 2 HIhs, PREcEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATivES
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solely to the integrity of the house. 46 Thus, as a practical matter,
congressional discipline cannot be relied upon to vindicate those in-
jured by congressional malfeasance. 47 Nevertheless, there is an al-
ternative to judicial policing of legislative speech: the ballot box.48
As the ultimate expression of the people's will, it serves as the final
guardian of legislative propriety. Not dependent upon the purity of
the legislature, it should be available even in the situation envisioned
in Kilbourn. In the event that it is not, there would be far more
serious dangers to the stability of the republic than unrestrained legis-
lative speech. Thus, in the final analysis, the safeguards for the public
against improper use of the privilege accorded legislators are placed
by the Constitution in the hands of the electorate. So long as this
remedy remains available, the privilege of the legislator not to answer
in any civil or criminal action for a speech in Congress should continue
to protect legislators in the proper discharge of their duties.
Eminent Domain-Compensability of Liens Based on Uncollected
Drainage District Assessments.--The state highway commission
brought two separate actions, involving different parcels of land
against a drainage district to determine whether the district, by virtue
of its lien based on a special improvements assessment,' was entitled
to compensation separate from that awarded to the landowner. In
795-860 (1907); 6 CANoN, id. at 402-10 (1935). The most notable censure motion
adopted since was that condemning Senator Joseph McCarthy for abusing the sub-
committee investigating his conduct as a senator. S. Res. 301, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
100 CoNG. REc. 16392 (1954).46 Two members of Congress were censured for taking bribes for appointments
to the service academies. See 2 HiNs, op. cit. supra note 45, at 796, 832-33. Two
were censured for their involvement in the Credit Mobilier scandal. See id. at
852-57. Representative Thomas Blanton of Texas was censured in 1921 for insert-
ing indecent and vile remarks in the Congressional Record; an expulsion motion
failed. See 6 CAxuox, id. at 402-05 (1935). In 1929 Senator Hiram Bingham of
Connecticut was censured for bringing an interested party into confidential
committee proceedings as his clerk. See id. at 408-10. Expulsion or censure was
ordered for a number of members of Congress accused of treasonable conduct,
especially during the Civil War. See 2 Hms, id. at 803-05, 812-27 (1907). The
remaining censure proceedings were for words insulting to the House or another
member. See id. at 798-802, 810-12.
47 See Yankwich 971-73.
4 8 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951); United States v. Johnson,
337 F.2d 180, 191 (1964); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 250 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
1 When the district was organized, the lands within it were assessed in propor-
tion to the benefits accruing from improvements to that land. The district had
financed the construction of such improvements by the issuance and sale of bonds.
The bonds were secured by liens representing the value of assessed benefits
on each parcel of land within the district. In order to liquidate the bonds, taxes
were levied in annual installments pursuant to these liens.
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